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Formulating Rational Drug Policy in California
Gerald F. Uelmen*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a criminal defense lawyer, I did not celebrate the enactment of the
"Victim's Bill of Rights" in California. In 1982, I was serving as President of
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, and I was very active in the campaign
against Proposition 8, as well as the legal challenges to its constitutionality. I felt
then, and still feel, that most of the provisions regarding victim's rights are
cosmetic, with minimal real impact. Victim's rights really served as a smokescreen to
hide the real agenda-a massive shift of judicial power into the hands of
prosecutors. Taking away judicial discretion as to punishment and putting it into
the hands of prosecutors has not improved our system of criminal justice. While
others have attributed the success of Proposition 8 to a legislature dominated by
Willie Brown, I question whether it is really an improvement to have a legislature
dominated by the Correctional Officers Association, the most powerful lobby. I
would rather have criminal justice policy dominated by elected officials with
extensive experience than by prison guards. With respect to the influence of
initiative measures, California's experience with initiatives has been a mixed bag
at best. Peter Schrag, in Paradise Lost, does an excellent job of documenting how
California has gone to "hell in a handbasket" during the past twenty-five years,
and the chief reason is the domination of our political process by initiative
measures. I
When conferences on criminal justice policy are convened, the defense bar is
often treated as part of the problem, rather than as part of the solution. When we
offer constructive suggestions, they are viewed with suspicion and distrust. The
defense bar's real motive, it is assumed, is to turn loose more of our cut-throat
clients to victimize the public. What is often forgotten is that the alleged victimizers
we represent often started down their path of criminality as victims themselves.
In many of the cases that plague our criminal justice system, it is almost
impossible to distinguish the victims from the victimizers.
The criminal defense bar shares the goal of breaking the vicious cycle by
which the victims often become the victimizers. Where we often part company
with prosecutors is in our willingness to accept treatment and rehabilitation as an
appropriate goal of the criminal justice system. Today, rehabilitation has achieved
anathema in the criminal justice system. We have erected over the doors of our
bulging prisons the sign that Dante posted over the gates of hell: "All hope
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abandon, ye who enter here.",2 While we can agree that some offenders are
beyond the hope of redemption, criminal defense lawyers find that most of their
clients are fully capable of turning their lives around, if given a helping hand.
The difficulty is sorting out which clients can be salvaged from the refuse that we
are consigning to the slag heap. In California, we are afflicted with real schizophrenia
on this issue. I find real irony in the same electorate rejecting judicial discretion
for juvenile offenders in Proposition 21,3 then at nearly the same time mandating
drug treatment instead of jail for drug offenders in Proposition 36.4 In both cases,
on both sides, there was a furious effort to manipulate public opinion with media
hype. Media hype often has more to do with the formulation of criminal justice
policy than any other factor.
II. MEDIA HYPE AND AMERICAN DRUG POLICY
Throughout thirty years of hope and frustration, I have labored in the vineyards of
academia, searching for a rational explanation for American drug policy. My
academic career began in 1970, the year that Richard Nixon announced we had
finally turned the corner in the war on drugs. After studying the sciences of
chemistry and pharmacology, the psychology and etiology of addiction, the
economics of wholesale and retail distribution, the ethics of the medical profession,
and the jurisprudence of criminal punishment, I have reluctantly come to the
conclusion that American drug policy does not really have much to do with
science, psychology, economics, ethics, or jurisprudence. Rather, it has more to
do with how politicians get elected. It has to do with media hype, plain and
simple.
The American addiction to media hype is not, of course, limited to drug
hype. Our foreign policy, economic policy, military policy, health policy-
indeed every aspect of American public policy-is impacted by media hype. But
in each of these arenas, occasional brief interludes of public lucidity help to keep
us on course. In the arena of criminal justice policy, however, and particularly
drug policy, we consistently and repetitiously reject the voices of reason, tear up
the scientific studies and the findings of commissions and councils, and repeat
the same mistakes over and over again.
Our national debate on drug policy is dominated by twelve-second sound
bites, devoid of thought but loaded with rhetorical zing. A recent Gallup poll
reflected that ninety-four percent of Americans were convinced that the greatest
2. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY CANTO 111, Line 9 (Edmund Gardner ed., J.M. Dent & Sons
Ltd. 1967) (1908).
3. Cal. Proposition 21: The Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/initiatives/2000/21 03_2000.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Laws'
Review) (approved by voters on Mar. 7, 2000).
4. Cal. Proposition 36: The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, available at
http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Prop. 36] (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (approved by voters on Nov. 7, 2000).
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challenge American faces is not the bankrupt social security system or the
unavailability of decent health care for millions of Americans; it is the abuse of
drugs.5 Yet the suggestion that judges, legislators, and journalists approach the
challenge by reading a book, studying a report, or attending a conference in order
to acquaint themselves with some credible factual information, is greeted with
horror. What, you want us to think about this problem? If the word leaked out
that we are thinking, we would be labeled "soft on crime." When is the last time
you heard of someone being elected judge or legislator on a platform that she
would be thoughtful about crime?
It is a useless exercise to seek to engage the shapers of public policy in
rational dialogue about drugs. When public opinion polls are so lopsided in
identifying a demon, and the demon has no credible defenders, no elected official
in America has any interest in studying the demon when she can simply
denounce it. The challenge now is to directly engage the public in rational
dialogue and begin a process of withdrawal from their addiction to sound bites.
In dealing with media-hype junkies, we must confront the denial that lies at the
heart of their disease. That denial at its core is a denial of complexity. The fix
that is offered by purveyors of media hype is the seductive fix of simplicity. We
must look for issues in which public policy has clearly been skewed by reliance
on oversimplified media hype and let people see that they were deprived of some
essential factual information before they made up their minds.
The public is educable and public opinion can be marshaled to support
rational changes in drug policy on at least three current issues. They are all issues
on which we have encountered judicial, executive, and legislative intransigence,
because media hype has drowned out any rational debate. But there are essential
factual premises that are not widely perceived by the public that can still be
communicated. When they are communicated, they can actually change people's
minds. Yes, knowledge can still function as a mind-altering substance.
The three issues to be discussed are: (1) needle exchange programs, (2)
medical use of marijuana, and (3) mandatory drug treatment programs instead of
incarceration.
A. Needle Exchange Programs
There is a need for needle exchange programs. Many people cannot get past
the moralizing-by distributing clean needles we are encouraging illicit behavior.
Media reports on this issue are always dominated by images of addicts shooting
up and nodding off in a filthy back alley. The subliminal message is that needle
exchange programs will convert our playgrounds into shooting galleries for drug
addicts. An analogy is often suggested to passing out condoms to teenagers.
5. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Introduction, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/demand/dfmanual/
intro.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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Preaching abstinence to intravenous drug users, however, is futile. They are truly
addicted, and they will inject themselves a thousand times a year, regardless of
what we have to say about it.
6
What is remarkable about public opinion on this issue is the extent to which
fear is so much more persuasive than compassion or logic. People are willing to
accept needle exchange programs, not to safeguard the health of intravenous drug
users, but to protect their own health. In California, it has been demonstrated that
twenty percent of new HIV cases are in needle users, their partners, and their
children. 7 Even more alarming, reports of the prevalence of Hepatitis-C among
intravenous drug users range as high as ninety percent.8 From the simple
standpoint of the menace to public health, needle exchange programs are key to
containing the spread of catastrophic fatal diseases for which we have no cure.
Despite this fearsome reality, we face continued intransigence of elected
officials. While the criminal prosecution of needle distributors has ceased
because juries refuse to convict them, government officials continue to harass
volunteer programs and bully publicly-funded programs. In California, former
Governor Pete Wilson twice vetoed legislation to legalize needle exchange
programs. 9 When local officials in Santa Clara County set up a county-funded
program, representatives of former Attorney General Dan Lungren visited and
threatened a civil suit on the ground that the State had preempted the field, and
county officials were spending tax resources on an illegal program.' 0 The county
program was then abandoned. With strong local backing, a bill to permit needle
exchange programs in California was finally signed by Governor Gray Davis two
years ago. 11
Comparing the negligible cost of clean needles to the catastrophic cost of every new
diagnosis of AIDS or Hepatitis-C makes a very compelling case for needle exchange
programs. Six federally funded studies made this case, but the White House Office of
6. National Center for HIV, STD and TB Prevention, Syringe Disposal, Jan. 2002, at http://www.cdc.
gov/idu/facts/aedidudis.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
7. San Francisco AIDS Foundation, Recommendations to Governor Davis and the California State Legislature,
Feb. 2001, at http://www.sfaf.org/policy/statereconnendations/syringes.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
8. Center for AIDS Prevention Studies at the University of California, San Francisco AIDS Research
Institute, Is Hepatitis C (HCV) Transmission Preventable?, Sept. 1999, available at http://www.caps.ucsf.edu/
hepC.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
9. Jack Cheevers, Needle Exchanges Battle AIDS and the Law; Public Health: Addicts Spread HIV by
Sharing Contaminated Syringes, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995, at Al, available at http://www.aegis.com/news/
It/1995/LT950102.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
10. Kathleen Sullivan, California Mayor Defends Needle Exchange, S.F. EXAMINER, May 24, 1996,
available at http://www.southcoasttoday.com/daily/05-96/05-24-96/a0wn0I0.htm (last visited October 25,
2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
I1. San Francisco AIDS Foundation, HIV Policy Watch, Oct. 1999, at http://www.sfaf.org/policy/
hivpolicywatch/9910pw.html#3 (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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National Drug Control Policy remains an adamant opponent of the programs, 12 and
Congress has refused funding for a program in the District of Columbia. 3
B. Medical Use of Marijuana
The second issue on which media hype can be overcome is the medical use
of marijuana. I vividly remember when the discovery was first reported that
marijuana might have legitimate medical uses. Police in Los Angeles (LAPD)
were taught that dilated pupils were a symptom of being under the influence of
marijuana. A major study at UCLA recruited student volunteers to puff a joint
and then have the size of their pupils measured. Volunteers for the study were
lined up around the block. The study conclusively established that short-term
exposure to marijuana has no effect whatsoever on pupil size. 14 It turned out that
what caused the pupils of LAPD suspects to dilate was simply fear-with good
reason. But the studies revealed that marijuana reduced the intraocular pressure
related to the disease of glaucoma.' 5 The federal government then set up a
program to provide government-grown marijuana to glaucoma patients and those
afflicted with other serious diseases. It was called the "Compassionate Use
Program." It was shut down in 1992. Government compassion was the first
victim of the AIDS epidemic, when the "Compassionate Use Program" was
deluged with new applications. Government officials announced that the program
was "sending the wrong message."' 6 Interestingly, that is the same phrase
government officials used in expressing their opposition to needle exchange
programs. The government believes the public is too stupid to understand that,
like narcotics and cocaine, marijuana may benefit sick people even though others
abuse it.
Growing numbers of ordinary citizens, who have watched loved ones waste
away and suffer with AIDS or cancer treatments, have come to question the
wisdom of laws that deny medication to sick and dying people when they observe,
first hand, the relief that marijuana can afford. This realization, more than media
hype, accounts for the growing public support for the legalization of the medical
use of marijuana. Public support has resulted in successful initiative measures in
12. Stephanie Stapleton, States Find Needle Exchanges Effective in HIV Prevention, AMER. MEDICAL
NEWS, Sep. 8, 1997, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/special/hiv/newsline/special/amnews/amnO98.htm
(last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
13. Norton Protests Ban on Funding for Needle Exchange Programs in the District of Columbia, Oct.
22, 1998, at http://www.house.gov/norton/pr_981022_needle.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
14. William Novak, High Culture: Marijuana in the Lives of Americans, at http://www.druglibrary.org/
special/novak/high cultureap2.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
15. National Eye Institute, NEI Statement: Glaucoma and Marijuana Use, Feb. 18, 1997, at http://www.
nei.nih.gov/news/statements/marij.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
16. Eugene L. Meyer, Uncle Sam's Aunt Mary, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1995, at F01.
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seven states to permit the medical use of marijuana with a physician's
recommendation.17 In California, Proposition 21518 was adopted by an overwhelming
margin in 1996.
Proposition 215 is a very simple measure. It provides that seriously ill
patients have a right to possess and use marijuana for medicinal purposes. As
long as they have the oral or written approval or recommendation of a physician,
patients are immune from prosecution for possessing or cultivating marijuana.
The law does not directly address the problem of distribution of marijuana to
these patients. Are they to go out to the back alleys and negotiate with illicit drug
dealers to procure their medicine?
The answer to that question from federal authorities is a resounding "yes." In
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative,19 the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected a claim of medical necessity as a defense to marijuana distribution
under the Federal Controlled Substances Act.20 Federal authorities raided and
shut down some of the most respected medical marijuana dispensaries in California,
facilities being openly operated with full approval of local authorities to serve the
needs of AIDS and cancer patients. Criminal prosecution is unlikely in most of
these cases because federal authorities realize California juries are unlikely to
convict. This is another example, along with needle exchange programs, of how
jury nullification can affect criminal justice policy.
Shortly after Proposition 215 was enacted, federal authorities announced that
any physician who recommended the use of marijuana would face suspension or
revocation of his federal permit to prescribe drugs.21 Needless to say, many
physicians became very nervous about putting their names on the recommendation
required under the law. A lawsuit was filed against the Drug Enforcement
Agency asserting the First Amendment right of physicians to freely discuss all
treatment alternatives with their patients, and in the case of Conant v. McCaffrey,
a preliminary injunction was issued to restrain the DEA from threatening California
physicians.2 The validity of that injunction is currently before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, along with a new round of constitutional arguments in
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative.
17. Editorial, Pot Vote Up in Smoke, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2002, available at http://www.mpp.org/USA/
news_1220.htm1 (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing Alaska,
California, Colorado, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington as states passing medical marijuana use
statutes).
18. Cal. Proposition 215: The Compassionate Use Act of 1996, available at http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/
Vote96/ html/BP/215 text.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (approved
by voters on Nov. 5, 1996).
19. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
20. Id. at 500. The author argued this case before the Supreme Court.
21. American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Urges Federal Court to End Government Persecution of
Doctors Over Medical Marijuana, Aug. 3, 2000, at http://www.aclu.org/DrugPolicy/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2002)
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
22. 172 F.R.D. 681, 685-87, 700-01 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd sub. noam. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629
(9th Cir. 2002).
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Ultimately, the fate of the medical marijuana movement may rest in the hands of
Congress. At least for now, we can anticipate the same knee-jerk response
engendered by the Sentencing Commission's recommendation to reduce the
disparity between crack cocaine and powdered cocaine. When an initiative
measure to approve medical use of marijuana in the District of Columbia was put
on the ballot, Congress put a rider on the Budget Appropriation for the District of
Columbia to forbid any expenditure of funds to count the ballots.23 A successful
lawsuit by the ACLU finally released the election results.24 The measure passed
by an eighty-percent margin.
There is much we can do to improve the implementation of Proposition 215.
Attorney General Bill Lockyer convened a task force to come up with suggestions,
and the task force's chief recommendation was the establishment of a statewide
registry, to provide a quick means of verification of the legitimacy of a claim of
physician authorization by a patient encountered by the police. The chief obstacle
to implementing that proposal has been Governor Gray Davis. There is also great
confusion about the number of plants a patient can cultivate to meet his medical
needs. With a vacuum at the statewide level, each county is establishing its own
guidelines, with wide disparity ranging from ninety-nine plants in Del Norte
25 26County to three plants in Tuolumne County. Recently, I argued a case in the
California Supreme Court that may provide some clarity. In People v. Mower, a
very sick patient, who had the requisite physician's approval, was subjected to
arrest and trial simply because his cultivation exceeded the three plant limit in
Tuolumne County.
27
C. Mandatory Drug Treatment Instead of Incarceration
The final issue to be discussed is the substitution of treatment for incarceration for
those convicted of drug possession. In November of 2000, the initiative process
finally gave the criminal defense bar something to cheer about. The enactment of
Proposition 3628 by an overwhelming margin of sixty-one percent marks a
significant turning point in California policy governing drug offenders. 29 The
persistent abuse of drugs will henceforth be a medical problem to be treated,
rather than a ticket for an endless carousel ride in and out of jails.
23. Turner v. D.C. Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2001).
24. Id. at 4.
25. Jennifer Grimes, Medical Marijuana Limits Upped by County, DAILY TRIPLICATE, May 2, 2002,
available at http://www.cannabisnews.com/news/12/threadl2695.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
26. People v. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th 457, 465-66 (2002).
27. Id.
28. Prop. 36, supra note 4.
29. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, A HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS 8 (2001).
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The initiative measure declares the new policy succinctly: "Community safety and
health are promoted, and taxpayer dollars are saved, when nonviolent persons
convicted of drug possession or drug use are provided appropriate community-
based treatment instead of incarceration." 30 The math that supports this finding is
disarmingly simple. It costs California taxpayers $23,406 per year to incarcerate
a drug offender. 31 Excellent community-based drug treatment can be provided at
an annual cost of less than five thousand dollars per person.32 In 1999, California
was incarcerating drug offenders at the highest rate in the nation-a total of
19,743 Californians were sent to prison for drug possession offenses.33
Proposition 36 appropriates sixty million dollars for a Substance Abuse Treatment
Trust Fund for the current fiscal year, then $120 million for each of the next five
fiscal years.34 The funds can be allocated to treatment programs, as well as
reimbursement of probation department and court costs. 35 Thus, a lot of political
maneuvering is occurring as counties line up for their slice of the pie. It is already
apparent that the pie is not big enough, requiring the Legislature to appropriate
supplemental funds. There should be more than enough savings in correctional
expenses to amply fund drug treatment, but prying it loose will require some real
political muscle. Perhaps a future conference should focus upon the influence of
the Correctional Officers Union upon criminal justice policy in California.
Ii. CONCLUSION
Each of the foregoing issues presents a different example of the same
phenomenon. Intransigent politicians stubbornly cling to irrational prohibitions
because they fear the power of a media label. If they are branded "soft on crime,"
politicians fear they will shrink to nothing in the next wash. Yet, when the
arguments are patiently explained to the public, without hype, they listen and
understand. The public is educable. On these three issues, California can lead the
nation to a full recovery from our national addiction to media hype and put us
back on the road to rational drug policy.
30. Id.
31. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (1997), available
at http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/pdf/facts.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
32. CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT, NATIONAL TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDY
(1997), available at http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/pdf/facts.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
33. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS DATA ANALYSIS UNIT (1999), available at http://www.
drugreform.org/prop36/pdf/correctional.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
34. Prop. 36, supra note 4 (beginning in the 2001-2002 fiscal year).
35. Id.
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Several years ago, I collaborated with thirty-eight other law professors on an
article entitled The Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra.36 Each of us took a famous
phrase allegedly uttered by Yogi and showed its application as a legal principle. I
say allegedly because Yogi himself said, "I really didn't say everything I said." 37
If I were to select the one Yogi Berraism that best sums up our experience in the
struggle for rational criminal justice policy in California, it would be this gem:
"You've got to be very careful if you don't know where you are going, because
you might not get there. 38
36. William D. Araiza, et al., The Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra, 46 EMORY L.J. 697 (1997).
37. Id. at 709.
38. Id. at 746.

